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ABSTRACT 
SPECULATION OR SPECIFICATION? 
A NOTE ON FLANIGAN AND ZINGALE 
Flanigan and Zingale's "Alchemists' Gold" reviewed the classic 
problem of inferring individual-level relationships from aggregate 
data, attacked the specification error approach to it, and sought to 
replace Goodman's ecological regression with an informal and largely 
untestable procedure first proposed by Shively in 197 4. They 
illustrated t�e Shively strategy by comparing evidence from the 
national CPS/SRC survey to state-level aggregate data from the 1968 and 
197 2 elect ions. 
In this note, I seek to show that their criticisms are 
misconceived and that ecological regression can, in many typical 
circumstances, lead to acceptably precise and much less vague judgments 
about the individual relationships than the method that Flanigan and 
Zingale promoted. I ape 11 out, apparently for the f iret time in the 
cliometric literature, the mechanisms for using data on other variables 
in order to improve the estimates of the parameters of principal 
interest, and employ these techniques to recalculate the way 1968 major 
party voters behaved in the 1972 U.S. presidential election. The 
multivariate ecological regression figures come pleasingly close to 
reproducing the "true" percentages of loyalists and defectors drawn 
from the survey. Making use of all the available data and of well­
developed and powerful statistical tests, ecological regression is far 
preferable to the Shively tactic. 
SPECULATION OR SPECIFICATION? 
A NOTE ON FLANIGAN AND ZINGALE 
In a recent article in Social Science History, Flanigan and 
Zingale reviewed the old problem of inferring individual relationships 
from aggregate data, cast doubt on Goodman's ecological regression 
technique as a method of estimating such relationships, and contended 
that the specification analysis approach to the issue was misleading. 
Instead, they argued that an ad hoc procedure suggested by Shively in a 
1974 article was superior to Goodman's point estimates because it 
avoids dubious assumptions and forces investigators to make their 
premises clear. Comparing results from analyses of state-level data on 
major party voting in the 1968 and 1972 presidential elections with 
figures from the Michigan survey s, they concluded, to their 
satisfaction at least, that the assumptions required for ecological 
regression were badly violated and that it was preferable in this and 
other cases to use the system that Shively, without making any 
grandiose claims for it, had originated. (Flanigan and Zingale, 1985; 
Goodman, 1959; Hanushek ,g!..l!.1., 1974; Shively, 1974; Langbein and 
Lichtman, 1978.) 
While I am always in favor of increasing the number of useful 
methods available to historians and political scientists, I will argue 
in this note, first, that Flanigan and Zingale's comments on the 
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specification error strategy are misconceived. Second, as a reanalysis 
of the example that they used will demonstrate, ecological regression, 
sensitively employed, can make better use of the available knowledge 
than does the tactic that they recommend, Consequently, it would be a 
mistake for political investigators who have access only to aggregate 
data to substitute Shively for Goodman, 
The inescapable problem in inferring individual from aggregate 
relationships is that we simply do not have data below the state, 
county, or, in some cases, township level, The lowest unite for which 
information has been collected are black boxes that we cannot see into, 
and nothing in either Shively's or Goodman's methods guarantees us 
certain know.ledge of their contents, Even if we luckily found a few 
unclosed cartons--for instance, by discovering records of open ballots 
or party lists for scattered townships, counties, or constituencies--we 
would still be able to guess the allegiances of a larger voting 
universe only by assuming that the relationships were the same in the 
concealed as in the uncovered containers. (Bourke and DeBats, 1978 and 
1980; Elklit, 1985; Austin _g.t .l!.1•• 1981, 94-95. ) But we do have 
hunches, which may be more or less well-founded, about what has gone on 
inside the bins in which we receive the data, and we can observe 
various facts about the relations between one box and another. The 
question is, how should we seek to use our knowledge--in ways that are 
partially testa ble, or through means that are fun d a m entally 
indeterminate? 
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In a brilliant paper in 1974, Hanushek tl AL.. questioned 
Robinson's famous 1950 derogation of aggregate data by showing that a 
multivariate regression model produced estimates of the individual 
relations between literacy and race or foreign birth that were much 
closer to the true individual relationships than were those based on 
the bivariate equations that Robinson had earlier employed. A more 
properly specified model, that is, one that took into account all the 
available information on the correlations not only between the 
dependent and independent variables, but also between each of these and 
other possible intervening variables as well, could not pry open the 
black boxes, but it could lead to better warranted conjectures about 
their internal composition. If the coefficients for the independent 
variables of interest changed markedly and their standard errors shrank 
when more independent variables were added and if the proportions of 
variance e x p l ained by the models rose appreciab ly, then the 
investigator had at least some evidence that the expanded regressions 
had produced more valid results. 
Flanigan and Zingale question this way of proceeding on the 
grounds that Hanuehek &AL.. merely estimated a different model, and 
that setting their results against the individual-level bivariate 
relationships was "comparing apples and oranges--or, better yet, cooked 
cabbage and raw carrots." (Flanigan and Zingale, 1985, 79.) To the 
extent that investigators are interested solely in causal inferences, 
such as the question of what accounts for the observed relations 
between race and literacy, their point is well taken. But if observers· 
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are concerned as well with purely descriptive matters--for instance, as 
Robinson was, with discovering the percentages of illiterate whites and 
blacks, or native- and foreign-born persons who were able to reed and 
write in 1940--then any method that improves the estimates of those 
numbers will be useful, whatever the number of variables on the right 
hand side of the equations. 
To view the matter from another angle, what do we assume about the 
other traits of the persons involved when we cross-classify two 
characteristics of individuals? Suppose we have a table which shows how 
those who cast ballots for Humphrey or Nixon in 1968 voted in 1972. In 
principle, and perhaps in fact, we know a great deal more about the 
subjects, which may allow us to construct sub-tables showing the 
political behavior of, say, whites and blacks, men and women, managers, 
professionals, union- and non-union manual workers, and the unemployed, 
etc. Some if not all of the choices of the groups captured in the sub-
tables would differ from each other. B u t  all these various 
relationships are, in effect, taken into account before being added 
together to form the basic two by two table for the whole population. 
Likewise, when we reduce specification errors by adding variables 
explicitly to the equation for aggregate data, we are just allowing for 
those sub-categorical relationships. After assessing the influence of 
the other traits, we may, if we wish, derive estimates of the entries 
of cross-classification tables that are of particular interest by 
operations very similar to collapsing sub-tables of individual-level 
data. 
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To anyone working with pre-survey era data, the quest ion of how 
this "summation" should be carried out is of some moment, Since it has 
not, to my knowledge, ever been entirely explained in the historical 
statistics literature, it may be useful to spell it out. Consider 
equation 1) , which involves only three variables, The dependent. 
variable, N72, is the percentage who voted for Nixon in 1972; the 
independent variables are the proportions for Nixon in 1968 (N68) and a 
"dummy" variable for region, which takes on the value 1 if the voter is 
southern, and 0 otherwise; the B's are the usual OLS parameters; and e 
is an error term, 
1) N72 = Bo + B1 N68 + B2 S + e , 
We proceed by first constructing separate two by two tables for each 
region, Northern voters who favored Humphrey in 1968 and McGovern in 
1972 are given by B0, since N68 and S are both zero by definition for
such persons, The estimate of southern Democratic loyalists is B0 + 
B2, because N68 is zero for them and B2 taps the deviation of southern 
from northern electoral patterns, Northerners who stayed with Nixon 
both times are equivalent to B1 - B0, the Nixon effect less the 
yellow-dog Democrats, and southern Nixon voters are measured by B1 - Bo 
+ B2• To get the national two by two table, we then multiply each
regional estimate by the proportion of total voters in the south and 
north, as appropriate, and add them, For instance, the total 
percentage of perservering Democrats is their southern percentage times 
the proportion of national votes that were cast in the south, plus the 
6 
percentage of Yankees who remained Democratic times the proportion of 
total votes recorded in the north, After determining the "stayers, " we 
can calculate the "movers" by subtracting the percentages of the party 
faithful from the overall percentages for McGovern and Nixon in 1972, 
The example gives concreteness to the analogy with collapsing 
categories in tables of individual or survey voting records to form 
more general tables, 
When we have some continuous independent variables, for example, 
income, instead of only dichotomous "control" variables, such as in 
equation 2) , where I stands for income, the proper procedure is to 
estimate the relationship and then determine the predicted percentage 
of the devoted and the switchers for persons of mean or perhaps median 
income. 
2) N72 = Bo + Bl N68 + B2 I + e , 
By e�timating the equation, we take into account the effect of I on the 
relationship between N68 and N72, To describe the most common or 
overall defection and stand-pat rates, those for the average person, 
therefore, we should estimate the rates for those with average incomes. 
(Naturally, for other purposes, it may be important to consider the 
rates for those of low or high incomes,) For instance, B0 added to B2 
times the average income yields the estimate of those who pressed the 
Democratic lever in both years, 
The same basic principles apply to cases in which the models are 
more complex, as in equation 3) , in which variables for the percentage 
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of each unit which is Catholic (C) and urban (U) have been added to the 
Nixon in 1968, income, and regional variables, 
3) 
Now, if we had information on each individual, C and U would be dummy 
variables, as S is. But if the only accessible data describes 
collections of voters, C and U become interval-level variables, If we 
focus on the stable and crossover rates for Humphrey and 1968 Nixon 
supporters, we should perform our regressions and then calculate those 
rates by setting the Catholic and urban proportions at their means and 
then multiplying by the values of the relevant coefficients. For 
example, northern Humphrey-McGovern support would be figured by adding 
Bo to the products of three coefficients with means of the associated 
variables: B2 times the average income, B3 times the average percentage 
Catholic, and B4 times the average proportion urban, Other cell
entries and even more complicated models can be dealt with using 
similar principles, 
This is not to say that more right hand side variables are always 
better than fewer, or that adding information will lead to very 
different estimates in every instance, Indeed, it will often be the 
case that many potential characteristics will have no substantively or 
statistically significant relationships with the dependent variable, 
after the traits that we are mainly curious about have been entered 
into the equations, or that the intercept and the coefficients for the 
most crucial indexes will be only marginally affected by introducing 
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other independent variables, But it is surely proper to reduce the 
error variance and the confidence intervals of the parameters of 
interest, if we have other information at hand, rather than to neglect 
to do so,l And if the analyst is primarily concerned with determining 
the relations among only a subset of all the measured variables, then 
the procedures outlined for equations 1) to 3) provide the proper 
parallel with the treatment of data on individuals. For those chiefly 
intent on description, as many historians are, Flanigan and Zingale' s 
dissmissal of the specification approach is simply mistaken. 
F lanigan and Zingale endorse what they desc ribe as a 
"conservative, controlled method for reducing the range of the 
individual relationship. 11 Faced with Robinson's seemingly devastating 
dismissal of aggregate data, Duncan and Davis pointed out in 1953 that 
even the grouped information placed some limits on the possible 
individual level correlations, Every state had some Humphrey and some 
McGovern voters, for example, and it is easy to show that in such a 
situation, there must have been at least a few people in each state who 
opted for the Democrats in both elections. (Duncan and Davis, 1953; 
Flanigan and Zingale, 1985, 82 for the quotation and 82-87 for more 
detail on the Duncan-Davis and Shively rationales,) The trouble is 
that these constraints are usually so loose that we cannot even tell 
whether the individual correlations are negative or positive. To 
constrict these bounds, Shively advanced the proposition that observers 
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might be willing to agree on some rules of thumb in analyzing the 
relationships between particular variables. 
Taking data from state-level returns from the 1 968 and 1172 
presidential elections, Flanigan and Zingale showed that the Duncan­
Davis method yields a range in the individual (phi or tau-beta) 
correlation of from +0,80 to -0.47, but that with "reasonable" 
assumptions, Shively',s strategy constricts that to the interval between 
+0.76 and .+0.48, The more restrictive the assumptions, the narrower 
the limits. Using survey data from 3 6  states, they demonstrated that 
the "true" phi is +0.60, while the estimate derived from bivariate 
ecological regression on state-level election returns is +0.74. 
Moreover, when they divided the survey data by states, they found 
considerable variation in phi coefficients from state to state, 
throwing doubt on an assumption crucial to ecological regreseion--that 
the within-area relationships differ only randomly from each other, 
Like Robinson, they seemingly invalidated a fairly widely used 
technique with a striking example, and they improved on hie performance 
by offering a less drastic solution than the total abandonment of what 
is usually for historians the only available information. 
Fortunately for those who have used ecological regression or who 
intend to in the future, Flanigan and Zingale'e arguments are unsound, 
There are four difficulties particular to their discussion of the 
example. First, answers to surveys do not, as Flanigan and Zingale 
recognize, precisely reflect what happens in the election booth.2 The 
observed discrepancy between the results from home-administered 
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questionnaires and voting returns probably partly reflects the fact 
that each source describes a related, but different action, Second, 
since a national sample is not drawn to be representative of state 
electorates, but only of the nation, survey data broken down by states 
does not provide a reliable standard against which to test the 
assumptions of ecological regression, Third, state-level data is so 
highly aggregated that it is hardly surprising that it yields imprecise 
estimates of personal voting patterns. Fourth, the proportions of 
loyalists and crossover voters estimated by bivariate ecological 
regression in this case are not really all that different from the 
survey results, even with grossly consolidated data, Relative to the 
"true" proportions found in the survey, the simplest Goodman-type 
procedure overes timates Nixon loyalism by five percent and 
underestimates Democratic defections from McGovern by eleven percent.3 
There are also two larger problems with the Shively technique in 
general that greatly diminish its usefulness, First, its weak tests 
apply only to the units that are the most behaviorally homogeneous. 
Second, it does not make use of all the available information, 
Consider Table 1, which shows hypothetical individual voting 
patterns (the "partials" or internal cell entries) grouped into units 
by area (the totals or "marginals") , If both elections are very close, 
as in Panel A, and if nearly all units have roughly equal marginal 
percentages, then a wide variety of assumptions about the internal cell 
entries will be consistent with the data, and the Shively bounds will 
be extremely broad, (Similarly, the bivariate ecological regression 
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coefficients will have large standard errors,) In this instance, from 
four to one hundred percent of the Democrats and zero to one hundred 
percent of the Republicans might have voted the same way in both 
elections. Since the only test on the assumptions (e.g., that at least 
half of Humphrey's voters supported McGovern) that his tactic allows is 
whether the posited partials could mathematically add up to the 
marginals, there will be few clear tests in such a situation, Any 
attempt to impose arbitrary and untestable constraints will be 
controversial, for what appears reasonable to one person may be 
ludicrous to another, 
(Table 1 about here) 
If one or more elections is a landslide, or if most units are all 
close to unanimous in the � direction in at least one of the two 
elections, as in Panel B, then the limits will be much more binding and 
the tests much more useful. In this case, Democratic crossovers could 
have amounted to no more than 20%, and Republican defections to no more 
than 22%, Both the Shively tacic and bivariate regression will perform 
well in this circumstance. 
A third idealized case, given in panel C, in which the internal 
cell entries give the range of possible partials that could satisfy the 
marginals, seems to me the one most likely to occur in county or 
townwhip level data, In this instance, the marginals for both units 
are entirely stable, and while one is overwhelmingly Democratic, the 
other is just as solidly Republican. Defection rates for each party 
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could range from zero to fifty percent, When there are only a few such 
counties, the analyst must choose between admitting that his 
assumptions are violated a certain number of times without being able 
to determine how many is too many, or publishing only a very broad 
estimate, which will not go very far towards answering the questions 
that he or she is presumably most interested in. In other words, in 
what seems likely to be a fairly typical situation confronting 
historical investigators, Shively's weak tests will either have to be 
jettisoned or the results will be vague and unsatisfying, 
In contrast, ecological regression may be able to produce accurate 
estimates in this third case, Shively's method focuses entirely on the 
relationships between the partials and marginals for only two 
variables, ignoring whatever knowledge we may have of other variables, 
If the historian instead uses multiple regression, he or she can employ 
such data and can make use of much more powerful means of evaluating 
the validity of his or her models, The key to seeing this is to ask 
why the voting patterns in the units in Panel C of Table 1 diverge so 
much from each other, The answer is that the areas differ in other 
respects as well, which in many cases will be measurable. One is, say, 
nearly all white, one predominately black, or one Protestant, the other 
Catholic, or one urban, the other rural, and so on, If we have 
sufficient data, we can take these extraneous variables into account in 
a multiple regression equation and obtain better estimates of the 
overall cohesion of the two parties over two elections than with 
bivariate regression and much more precise estimates than with the 
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strategy of intuitive and largely untestable hunches that Flanigan and 
Zingale propose, 
Let us focus on their example, The single most obvious fact about 
the comparison between the 1968 and 1972 elections is that in the 
former, there were three significant candidates, but in the latter, 
only two. While George Wallace's disproportionate appeal in the south 
muddles estimates of the major party voting patterns from aggregate 
data, it suggests at the same time better models, that is, models 
including regional dummy variables, 4 Equation 1) , discussed earlier, 
and equation 5) , g iven below, represent two ways to operationalize 
regional effects, In equation 1) , it was assumed that equations for 
the south and the non-south merely had different intercepts, Equation 
5) may be used to test the hypothesis that within each region, the
slope of the relationships between voting for Nixon in 1968 and in 1972 
differed as well. Thus, the variable S times N68 in equation 5) 
reflects the interaction between Nixon support and the regional effect, 
5) N72 Bo + B1 N68 + B2 S + BJ S N68 + e, 
The important advantage of such a model, which is equivalent to 
dividing the data into sets of the northern and southern states and 
running separate regressions on each group, is that it allows tests of 
the hypotheses. 5 If B2 and BJ are stat ist ica l ly significant and the
proportion of variance explained, adjusted for the diminished degrees 
of freedom, rises, then we know that we have better estimates of the 
relationships between the marginal proportions. 
counterpart in the Shively method. 
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There is no 
What results do we get if we apply this method to the 1968 and 
1972 state-level election data? Table 2 contains estimates of three 
ecological regression equations: a bivariate model and the more 
complex models given in equations 1) and 5), The increases from model 
1 to model J in the variance explained and in the t-statistics for N68, 
and the fact that the t-statistics for both the intercept and the slope 
for the regional dummies are greater than 2,0, which corresponds to a 
level of significance greater than 0.05, show that the more complex 
equations fit the aggregate marginals better than model 1 does, 
(Table 2 about here) 
They also yield estimates of the individual transition matrix that 
are closer to the survey results. Table J compares the percentage 
estimates implied by the equations in Table 2 with the "true" 
percentages from the Michigan survey given in Flanigan and Zingale's 
article, While model 1 overestimates the Nixon admirers by 4.8% and 
underestimates the McGovern haters by 2.8%, model 2 and especially 
model J are nearer the mark, Model J reproduces the 197 2 behavior of 
1968.Republican voters almost exactly and overestimates Democratic
loyalty by only 2.2%, Flanigan and Zingale' a bounds, on the other 
hand, imply percentage estimates for the Nixonians of from 85. 5% to 
95, 0%, and of Democrats disgruntled with McGovern of from 21.1% to 
J9.5%. While the near misses of Model J would, I believe, satisfy most 
15 
historians, a range of Humphrey defectors of from one in five to two in 
five would cause considerable consternation.6 
(Table 3 about here) 
When Shively first introduced the modified Duncan-Davis bounds. 
procedure, he claimed only that it "· • •  may be a useful supplement to 
ecological regression. 11 (Shively, 197 4, 71.) Flanigan and Zingale were 
less reserved, and sought to replace ecological regression entirely. 
But their critique of the specification approach to the problem was 
misleading, and a more subtle analysis of their example demonstrates 
why and how ecological regression can be made much more useful to 
historians than the technique that Flanigan and Zingale· favor. Their 
article will have served a useful purpose, however, if it contributes 
to a more complete understanding of the problems of using aggregate 
data to estimate the behavior of individuals and if it leads historians 
to employ more sensitive and complex models. 
1. 
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FOOTNOTES 
I freely admit that before the Hanushek �.!li.· article, I did not 
see this solution as clearly as I have since, and that the 
estimates in Kousser, 1974, might in some cases have been improved 
if I had understood it better. 
2 • .  Flanigan and Zingale, 1985, 72, starkly contrast the "imaginative" 
use of survey data on the recall during the 1950s of their votes 
during the 1920s by Andersen, 197 9 and Butler and Stokes, 196 9, 
with the "uncritical" use of ecological regression by unnamed 
historians. They fail to note the devastating critiques of the 
recall data in those works by Niemi et .!li.·• 1980, and Katz� .!li.·• 
1980, and perhaps underestimate the care with which at least some 
'political historians have tried to test the validity of the 
methods that they used for their particular data sets. In fact, 
after a long honeymoon with surveys, political scientists have 
recently begun to see many virtues in more aggregated data. See, 
e.g., Kramer, 1983; Ingelhart, 1985. 3 .  The estimates below in
Table 2, model 1 are even closer to the survey results because I 
used all fifty states plus the District of Columbia, whereas they 
used only the aggregate data from 36 states. If the survey sample 
was chosen to be nationally representative, then it broke the 
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analogy for Flanigan and Zingale to restrict the aggregate 
estimates to 36 states, 
4. It seems somewhat strange that Flanigan and Zingale t.hemsel ves did 
not attempt to estimate a more complex ecological regression model 
with southern dummy variables, for they noted that they might have 
applied different assumptions to each region in a Shively-type
analysis, and they have elsewhere remarked that "Perhaps dummy
variable analysis offers the simplest and most promising expansion 
in the use of multiple regression introduced in recent years, 11 
Flanigan and Zingale, 1985, 86; and 1981, 260. 
5, For a fuller description of the dummy variable procedure and proof 
that equation 5) is equilavent to running separate regressions on 
subsets of variables, see Johnston, 1984, 225-27, 6, Flanigan and 
Zingale state their bounds as individual tau-beta coefficients, 
which for two by two tables are equilavent to phi coefficients, 
but the range of individual percentages corresponding to those 
bounds can be recaptured for a table with given marginals by 
guessing at the percentages, calculating the phi's, and then 
repeating the process until one gets the correct phi's, It is 
unclear to me why anyone would be interested in the range of tau 
betas, which signify only proportionate error reduction, rather 
than in the percentages, which have a meaningful substantive 
interpretation. Since few historians are familiar with tau 
betas--those with memories as bad as mine have to rush off to old 
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statistics texts to review the meaning and formulas for such 
statistics each time that we run into them--using them only adds 
mystification to an already sufficiently arcane practice. 
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TABLE l 
HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLES OF INDIVIDUAL VOTES 
AGGREGATED INTO AREAL UNITS 
Panel A: Cliffhanger Elections Mean Wide Bounds 
D l* Rl Tot, Dl Rl Tot. 
51 0 51 2 49 51 
0 49 49 49 0 49 
51 49 100 51 49 100 
Panel B: One Landslide Election Narrows the Estimates 
Dl Rl Tot, Dl Rl Tot. 
51 39 90 41 49 90 
0 10 10 10 0 10 
51 49 100 51 49 100 
Panel C: Extreme and Divergent Patterns Also Lead to Wide Bounds 
Dl Rl Tot, 
85-90 0-5 90 
0-5 5-10 10 
90 10 100 
Dl 
5-10 
0-5 
10 
Rl Tot. 
0-5 10 
85-90 90 
90 100 
* Entries are percentages. Categories are Democratic in first
election (Dl) , Republican in first election (Rl) , Democratic in
second election (D2) , Republican in second election (R2) , and
totals for each election (tot,) ,  In Panel C, entries are possible 
ranges of percentages. 
TABLE 2 
ECOLOGICAL REGRESSION EQUATIONS FOR 50 STATES AND THE 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 1968 AND 1972 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS* 
Model # 1 2 3 
Constant .0498(0. 86) • 0891( 1. 98) .0149( 0 .37) 
Nixon '68 .6541( 5. 57) .6278(6.97) • 7796( 9.61) 
South -.1041(-5.95) .3723 (3 , 70) 
s * N68 - • 9905(-4. 7 8) 
R2 .388 .648 .763 
adj. R2 .375 .633 .748 
23 
* Entries are regres sion coefficients with t-statistics in
parentheses, Variables are: 
Nixon '68 =% of two-party vote for Nixon in 1968, 
South = 1 for 11 ex-Confederate states, Kentucky, and 
Oklahoma, 0 otherwise, 
S * N68 =Nixon 1968 percentage if state was in South, 0 
otherwise, 
R2 = percentage of variance explained, 
adj, R2 = R2 adjusted for degrees of freedom, dependent 
variable in all equations is % of two-party 
vote for Nixon in 1972. 
TABLE 3 
THE ESTIMATES IMPLIED BY THE MODELS IN TABLE 2 COMPARED 
TO THE "TRUE" SURVEY PICTURE OF THE 1968-1972 ELECTIONS* 
Panel A: The Survey Estimates 
1968 Election 
Nixon 
Humphrey 
1972 Election 
Nixon 
90.2 
32.4 
McGovern 
9.8 
67.6 
Panel B: Estimates From Model (Bivariate) 
1972 Election 
Nixon McGovern 
1968 Election 
Nixon 95.0 5.0 
Humphrey 29.6 70.4 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
Panel C: Estimates From Model 2 (Regional Intercept Differences) 
1968 Election 
Nixon 
Humphrey 
1972 Election 
Nixon 
93 .4 
30.9 
McGovern 
6.6 
69.1 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
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Panel D: Estimates From Model 3 (Regional Intercept and Slope 
Differences) 
1968 Election 
Nixon 
Humphrey 
197 2 Elect ion 
Nixon 
90.l 
34.6 
McGovern 
9.9 
65.4 
* Entries are percentages, which add to 100% across rows. 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
